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COMMENTS
THE UBIQUITOUS DETAILMAN: AN INQUIRY
INTO HIS FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES
AND THE LAWS RELATING TO THEM*
A salesman of ethical pharmaceuticals1 is no ordinary salesman.
True, he sometimes earns his commissions based on his sales, as do
other salesmen, but there the similarity ends, for he is charged not
only with selling his product, but also with unselling it.2 He is often
called the detailman, defined as: 3
[One who] promotes [the] use of and sells ethical drugs and
other pharmaceutical products to physicians, dentists, [and]
hospitals ...

utilizing knowledge of medical practices, drugs,

and medicines. [He] [i]nforms customer[s] of new drugs, explains characteristics and clinical studies conducted with
drug[s]. [He] discusses dosage, use, and effect of new drugs and
medical preparations.
Thus the pharmaceutical detailman is not the average cardboard box
salesman whose misinformation to the customer might lead only to
the damage of parcels packed in a carton which is not strong enough
to bear the weight of its contents; his misinformation to the customer (i.e. the physician) regarding his products may result in physical injury, pain, suffering, even death, to the ultimate consumer
(i.e. the patient).
The "ubiquitous detailman" is a phrase taken from a Washington state court decision.4 He is ubiquitous in the truest sense of the
word. To the medical and health professions he is omnipresent. He
® The author is grateful to Prof. Josephine Y. King (Ph.D., J.D.) for her helpful
comments on the original draft of this article. The generous assistance offered by
Prof. Aaron D. Twerski (J.D.) on subsequent revisions provided the author with a
constant source of invaluable intellectual stimulation.
1. Ethical pharmaceuticals are also known as prescription drugs. For a statutory
definition see Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1970).
2. See Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 292, 282 A.2d 206, 222 (1971) in which the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania states: ". . . the trial court instructed the jury that if
it found that Parke Davis was on notice that the drug was being used indiscriminately,
and yet failed to restrict its use to proper situations, then the company could be found
negligent."
3. U.S. DEPARTiENT or LABOR, 1 DiCrlONARY or OcCUPATIONAL TILS, at 525 (3d ed.

1965).
4. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 78, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967).
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can be found in the practitioner's inner office, in the pharmacy, and
in the hospital corridors5 speaking with interns, residents, and attending staff. He is at the nurse's station and outside the ICU and
CCU. 6 He is in the medical, dental, and nursing schools, at medical
conventions, seminars and exhibits, and even in the hospital coffee
shop enjoying a snack with a hospital physician, pharmacist, administrator, or formulary committee 7 member. In short, he is found
with anyone who may now or in the future have the occasion to use
or encourage the use of his products. His purpose is not only to inform these members of the health team of the proper use of his company's products, but also to expand his market of potential
prescribers, dispensers, and users.
The detailman is the most important liaison between the pharmaceutical company and the medical profession. While the Congress
and the federal judiciary are keenly aware of the need to control
the relationship of the drug industry and the medical profession,
the most effective controls growing out of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act s do not provide the federal government with any
power to control the detailman or the quality of his product presentations. 9 This is so because the Act and FDA regulations apply only
to written statements coming from the manufacturer. Nor have the
courts adequately considered the detailman's responsibilities. Scholars have made a few attempts to analyze his function, but these have
been cursory. This is possibly because, as one writer quite correctly
notes, "the only way to get a fair picture of [the detailman's] activi5. An excellent empirical study which analyzes the attitudes of physicians and
detailmen in regard to the latter's function in the large teaching hospital setting is
Burkholder, The Role of the PharmaceuticalDetailman in a Large Teaching Hospital,
20 Am. J. Hose. PHARm. 275 (1963), in B. KELLER AND M. SMITH, PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING: AN ANTHOLOGY AND BILIOGRAPHY 280 (1969). PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING is
a comprehensive collection of articles relating to all phases of pharmaceutical marketing. Numerous selections therein deal with non-legal background material on detailing
activities.
6. ICU and CCU are, respectively, the commonly used initials for the intensive
care unit and the coronary care unit of the hospital wherein critically ill patients
are kept under close surveillance largely through the use of electronic monitoring
devices.
7. For a discussion of the significance of the formulary committee in choosing the
drugs to be purchased by the hospital and prescribed by the hospital's physicians, see
Burkholder, in B. KELLER AND M. SMrrH, supra note 5, at 280.
8. Statutory and regulatory provisions relevant to this study are cited and analyzed
infra.
9. The federal government's lack of jurisdiction over the detailman's oral promotional statements is the central theme of Section II B of this article, infra, Federal
Statutory and Regulatory Standards.
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ties is to 'live' them for a while."10 This author did just that for a
period of 27 months."1 These experiences12 underly the analysis of
the law relating to detailmen which follows. The analysis will indude first a discussion of the importance of the detailman to the
drug manufacturer in the sale of its products, and his role as the
physician's principal source of drug information. Second, it will include a consideration of several issues arising out of this duality of
functions and its legal consequences. This section will survey alternative theories which courts may use to impose liability on the manufacturer. In conclusion, a proposal will be offered which may help
to alleviate the strain placed upon the detailman as a result of his
conflicting duty to sell his employer's drugs on the one hand and his
duty to warn the physician of product dangers on the other.
I.

THE DETAILMAN'S DILEMMA: THE DuTy To
SELL V. THE DUTY To WARN

In terms of agency law the detailman is the servant of the pharmaceutical manufacturer.' As master, the manufacturer is vicariously liable for the acts of his servants which occur within the scope
of employment. It is therefore in the employer's economic interest
to prevent his detailmen from pursuing activities which may cause
such liability to be imposed.' 4
Because of the need to increase and protect the substantial profitsW which drug manufacturers realize from the sale of their products, several companies have gone to great expense to develop and
10. Wilig, The Medical Detailer and the New Drug Amendments of 1962, 20 FooD
DRUG Cosm. L.J. 221 (1965).
11. From June, 1969 to September, 1971 this author was employed as a Professional
Representative for the New York regional office of Merck Sharp and Dohme, division
of Merck &,Co., Inc. [hereinafter MSD].
12. In order to distinguish between discussions and conclusions based on the
author's personal experience as a detailman, and those which were derived from
research and documentary sources, an effort has been made to separate the two through
the appropriate use of footnotes.
13. There is an express employment agreement between the detailman and the
drug manufacturer. Courts have found that the detailman is also the manufacturer's
agent for purposes not contemplated by the employment agreement: Schering Corporation v. Cotlow, 94 Ariz. 365, 885 P.2d 234, 17 A.L.R.3d 617 (1963). For a comparison
of servant and agent see F. MECtEM, ON AGENCY § 36 (2d ed. 1914) and RESrATEAENT
(SEcoND) OF AGENCY, § 220 (1958).
14. F. MAcHEM, ON AGENCY §§ 1855 et seq., 1879, 1881 (2d ed. 1914); REsrATERENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 229 (1958).
15. See M. CooPER, PRUCEs AND PROFITS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1966).
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administer training programs16 for their detailmen. This training
serves a dual purpose. On the one hand the' detailman is instructed
to give only reliable, accurate and current information to physicians.
On the other, he is taught sales techniques and managerial skills
which seek to foster market expansion. Often these two training
goals conffict with one another, leaving the detailman in a dilemma
as to which should prevail.
A.

The Duty to Sell

The need for training programs becomes evident when viewed
in the context of the detailman's importance to the manufacturer."
Detailing... has received increased emphasis in the postwar
period. Indeed, its importance to the marketing effort has increased .... The postwar period has seen increasing emphasis
on research and development. Expenditures for research and
development by member firms of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing [sic] Association rose from $60 million [to] ... $400
million for 1966. This is a 667 per cent increase during the
sixteen-year period.
From these budgetary increases came new and sophisticated phar16. The preliminary training this author had at MSD extended over a period of
nine months and consisted of three phases. Phase #1 was an eight week period of
intensive programmed learning in the general fields of medicine related to the company's products. Phase #2 consisted of two weeks of lessons dealing with specific
product information, detailing methods, and medical lectures by practicing physicians.
A six month interval followed during which the detailman, under his manager's supervision, became acquainted with his territory, his physicians, and his pharmacy accounts. Phase #3 followed this intervening practical experience and consisted of two
weeks of additional product information and medical lectures. The major portion of
this last preliminary phase, however, was managerial training wherein the class of detailmen used, as its standard texts, G. ODIORNE, MANAGEMENT By OnjEcrivEs: A SYsrEM
Or MANAGERIAL LADERsHIw (1965) and J. NIRENBERG, GETTING THROUGH To PEOPLE
(1963), in addition to other training aids compiled by the company's training staff.
All phases of training involved numerous written examinations, the passing grade of
which were 90%. Follow-up training in the form of week-long seminars and lectures
every year or two, programmed correspondence courses, journal articles, and one- or
two-day lecture sessions at necessary intervals are part and parcel of the detailman's
job at MSD.
Other drug manufacturers send their representatives to the Certified Medical Representative training program. Eli Lilly and Company, for example, may avoid similar
training costs by hiring pharmacists as their detailmen. For a brief discussion of the
training, duties, recruitment, and managerial functions of the detailmen see M. SMITH,
PRINCIPLES OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKErING 299-312 (1968). See further bibliographical
references, id. at 316.
17. D. KING, MARKETING PRESCRPION DRUGS 59 (1968).
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maceutical products"" with which physicians had little familiarity.
Ordinary journal advertising and mass mailing campaigns were not
sufficient to persuade the medical profession 19 to use these products,
20
and more effective promotional techniques had to be used.
In 1960, there were about 15,000 detailmen employed by American drug manufacturers. While the ratio of detailmen to all other
employees of selected pharmaceutical firms varies from 1:10 to 1:6,
about 25% of all employees in the industry are absorbed in marketing functions. Fifty four percent of these are involved in detailing
alone.21
It is difficult to document precisely how much the pharmaceutical industry spends on detailing activities. In 1957, Eli Lilly and
Company estimated that a direct mailing to a single doctor costs
7-¢ per piece and a journal advertisement 1¢ per physician, but one
detailing visit costs $7.50 per doctor. Two years later, Smith Kline
and French Laboratories estimated their detailing cost at between
18. For an interesting but cursory analysis of the effects of rapid pharmaceutical
progress in the postwar period and legislative attempts to control the ensuing ramifications see Lasagna, The PharmaceuticalRevolution: Its Impact on Science and Society,
166 ScmNca 1227 (Dec. 5, 1969).
19. A good summary of several empirical studies which show, among other things,

the importance of the detailman in motivating physicians to prescribe particular
pharmaceutical products appears in M. Smarm, supra note 16, at 62-77, 298. But see
Burkholder in B. KELLER AND ML SAm=, supra note 5, at 281-82, wherein he states:
There are conflicting reports on the merits of the pharmaceutical detail man's
role. Physicians often deny that detail men are of major importance in convincing them relative to the selection of drugs used in treating their patients.
They even minimize the extent to which they rely on detail men as a source
of information in such matters. There are, of course, studies which show the
reverse. However, any results must always be seriously questioned when it is
not clear what population is being analyzed or in what manner the sample members were selected. It is no less important to know for whom the study was done,
who carried it out and who financed it.
20. D. KING, supra note 17, at 60:
The detailman invests promotion with the human approach, for which there is
no substitute. The two-way communication possible in the face-to-face interview has always been the marketer's most forceful means of persuasion. The
detailman is given an average of only eight to ten minutes of the physician's
time per call. Yet in this brief time he can accomplish what other forms of promotion cannot do. He can answer directly and immediately the [physician's]
unusual questions.
Furthermore, he can detect the cause of the physician's doubts and address his sales
presentation to their elimination by combining his scientific training and persuasive
selling techniques into a well-thought-out presentation.
21. Id. at 65. See also Haggins, Due Care by Physicians, 14 Clxv.-MAR. L. Rxv. 506,
508 (1965) (brief treatment of the role of the detailman and the eltent to and reason
for which he is used in drug promotion).
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$9 and $10 per physician call.2 2 A more recent source states that in
196623
approximately three quarters of a billion dollars [was] spent
... by some sixty drug companies in order to reach, persuade,
cajole, pamper, outwit, and sell one of America's smallest markets-its 180,000 practicing physicians.... A little over half
of these promotional expenses (which represents approxi-

mately 25% of the receipts from sales of drugs) are for advertisements or samples and the other half for salaries of
detailmen.
As part of his sales effort the detailman brings gifts and gimmicks
to the physician. The purpose of these gifts is not only to woo the
physician, but more important, to act as a constant reminder to the
doctor to prescribe the detailman's products. The gifts usually re22. D. KING, supra note 17, at 64. Some idea as to how much a manufacturer might

spend on detailing, in comparison to other forms of promotion, in order to introduce
a new product to physicians is given by Ben Gaffin & Associates in THE FOND Du LAC
STUDY: AN INTENSIVE STUDY OF THE M ARETING OF FIVE Naw ETHIcAL PHARMACEUTICAL
PRODUCTS IN A SINGLE MARKET, RFESULTING IN SOME THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC MARKETING

AND SERVICE PROGRAMS FOR ACTION (A BASIC MARKETING STUDY PREPARED FOR THE AMER.
icAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 1956), reprinted in Hearings on Present Status of Competition in the PharmaceuticalIndustry Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the
Select Comm. on Small Business, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, App. XII,
5811 at 5856 (1969) [hereinafter FOND DU LAc STUDY].
Id. at 5858 and at 5864 the following figures are given for promotional expenditures
by Ciba in 1954 in its effort to introduce its antihypertensive SERPASzL:
Detailing ...................................................
$900,000
Convention exhibits .........................................
150,000
Sampling ...................................................
200,000
Journal advertisements .......................................
250,000
Direct mail ................................................
400,000
Id. at 5882 and at 5889 the following figures are given for promotional expenditures

by Geigy from May, 1952 to the end of the year, in its effort to introduce its anti.
inflammatory BuTrAzoLmN:
Detailing ...................................................
$140,000
Direct mail .................................................
190,000
Convention exhibits .........................................
6,000
Sampling ...................................................
40,000
Journal advertising ..........................................
45,000
Id. at 5896 and at 5903 the following figures are given for Lederle's first year promotional expenditures in its effort to introduce its antibiotic ACHROtYCIN:
Detailing ..................................................
$1,026,000
(Includes literature and samples for detailmen)
Direct mail ................................................
851,000
Journal advertising ........................................
470,000
Convention exhibits .......................................
100,000
23. Address by H. E. Simmon, M.D., M.P.H., Director, Bureau of Drugs, Food and
Drug Administration, before the Academy for the Advancement of Science, Chicago,
Dec. 29, 1970, reprinted in Hearings on Present Status of Competition in the Pharma.
ceutical Industry Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Select Comm. on Small
Business, U.S. Senate, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 21, vol. 4, 8438 at 8441 (1971).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol1/iss1/14

6

et al.: Ubiquitous Detailman: An Inquiry Into His Functions and Activitie

Comments
main or easily come into the physician's view when he writes a prescription for a patient. Of course, these gifts are inscribed with the
name of the product being promoted. Thus, it is rare to find a doctor's office without advertising pens, memo pads, paper weights, ash
trays, desk blotters, apothecary jars, coffee mugs and other paraphernalia distributed by the drug companies through their detailing
forces.
Just as these gifts seek to remind the physician to prescribe the
products which the detailman has promoted, they may also have a
reverse effect. When a physician's patient has adversely reacted to a
drug which has been heavily promoted, and for which a gift has
been distributed, the physician may well be reminded not to prescribe that drug. It is preposterous to assume that a physician will
continue to use a bad product even though he has received a promotional gift from that company's detailman. 24
24. This conclusion is drawn from the author's personal experience. See also
Hagood and Owen, The Image of the Drug Industry as Seen by Town and Gown, VA.
mxsI
cAL oNTi Y, Feb. 1967, at 110-14; Fassold and Gowdey, A Survey of Physicians
Reactions to Drug Promotion, CANAD. MED. Ass'N J., April 6, 1968, vol. 98, at 701,
reprinted in Hearings on Present Status of Competition in the PharmaceuticalIndustry
Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Select Comm. on Small Business, U.S. Senate,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, App. IV, 5789 at 5741 (1969) [hereinafter Physicians' Reactions] contains the following:
Question 2-Which of the following do you think most influences you to use
a drug for the first time?
From these results it would appear that most doctors like to obtain information on new drugs from their colleagues (Table II). Continuing education programs dealing with pharmacology and therapeutics could supply at least some
of this information.
TABLE IE.-PREFERRED SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON NEW DRUGS
Choice of answers

Distribution
of answers

Percent

Manufacturer's written advertising (direct mail, ad- Specialists .............
vertisements in journals, etc.) ................ General practitioners ..
All doctors ............
Manufacturer's spoken advertising (detailman, ex- Specialists .............
hibits, etc.) .................................. General practitioners ..
All doctors ............
Colleague or consultant recommendation ........ Specialists .............
General practitioners ..
All doctors ............
Patient request ................................ Specialists .............
General practitioners ..
All doctors ............
Other ......................................... Specialists .............
General practitioners ..
All doctors ............

6
3
4
18
31
24
57
54
56
2
1
19
11
15

Note: Total number of doctors replying, 521.
It is the author's opinion that both the physicians he serviced and MSD preferred
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One part of the detailman's sales responsibility is to coordinate
drug promotion in his "territory." He is required to submit reports
of how many physicians he has visited each day. These records are
used to determine the detailman's effectiveness in terms of the relation of total sales to the number of completed physician calls. The
assumption on the part of the detailman's manager is that more calls
lead to higher sales. Thus, to his employer, the detailman is primarily a salesman whose continued employment and good standing depend largely on how successful he is in achieving and exceeding his
sales quotas.2
B.

The Duty to Warn

Nevertheless, the physician views the detailman as the single
most important, 26 worthwhile,2 7 and acceptable 28 source of informadiscontinuing the distribution of promotional materials which had no relevance to
the doctors' practice. But see M. SMiTH, supra note 16, at 311, wherein he states:
[lailing under the heading of sales promotion are the many "giveaways" with
which the detailman is usually supplied. These items may range from books of

matches to elaborate desk sets-all appropriately inscribed with the drug name,
of course. The use of these gimmicks has received strong criticism from industry
critics, but anyone who has visited his physician recently will have to admit that
the physician seems willing to make use of them.
25. See Whitehead, Drug Peddler, 67 NEw STATESMAN 906, June 12, 1964, for an
interesting account of a British detailman's shortlived career, reprinted in B. KELLER
AND M. SMrrH, supra note 5, at 329.
26. FOND DU LAC SrunY, supra note 22, at 5839.
27. Id. at 5840.
28. Physicians' Reactions, supra note 24, at 5741:
Question 1-Which of the following drug promotion methods do you think
usually is most informative and/or most acceptable? and Which of the following drug promotion methods do you think is least informative and/or least
acceptable?
Analysis showed that 56% of the general practitioners replying to this question considered the drug detailmen most informative and/or acceptable and
76% indicated that direct mail advertising is least informative and/or acceptable.
Not so many specialists (57%) appeared to find the drug detailmen most informative or acceptable, and not quite as many (59%) reacted adversely to direct
mail.
Fig. 1 summarizes the reactions of all doctors replying and shows clearly that,
taken separately, the method of drug promotion most informative and/or acceptable involves the drug detailmen, whereas the least informative and/or
acceptable is direct mail advertising.
It is realized, of course, that some of the reactions expressed to this and several
other questions may have been coloured by the impressions made on doctors
by the drug detailmen and direct mail arriving in the office just before the
questionnaire. But the answers given lead us to conclude that in many cases
these opinions are held strongly and were not prompted by the questions
themselves.
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TABLE 1.-PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ANSWERS
FROM ALL DOCTORS

Most in- Least Informative formative
and/or
and/or
most ac- least acceptable ceptable
1st choice 1st choice
or no
or no
rankl
rankl

Choice of answers
Direct mail advertising ..............................
Drug detailman .....................................
Exhibits at medical meetings, etc. [2] ................
Advertising in medical journals ......................
Other ...............................................

6
46
20
19
9

67
13
8
12
0

Total number of doctors replying ....................

521

521

1. To the question on "Most acceptable" 16 doctors gave more than 1 answer
but did not rank them; both answers are included in totals and percentage calculations. Similarly, for "Least acceptable," 39 doctors gave 2 unranked replies
and these are included.
[2. Such exhibits are conducted by detailmen.]
Id. at 5743:
Question 7. How would you grade most detailmen with regard to the following attributes?
Table VII shows that the majority of doctors rated most detailmen favourably (i.e., "good" or "excellent") as to personality (86%), reliability (65%) and
honesty (69%); not so favourably (i.e., "fair" or "poor") in the categories of
general knowledge (67%), knowledge of drugs (63%) and usefulness (59%).
TABLE VII.-ASSESSMENT OF DETAILMEN
Attribute
Personality ..................
Reliability ..................
Honesty ....................
General knowledge ..........
Knowledge of drugs ..........
Usefulness ..................

Poor
Fair
Good Excellent answers
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) Total
5
2
11
13
18

14
30
30
56
50
41

12
9
9
2
3
3

74
56
60
32
34
38

519
504
503
506
513
509

Question 8-Have you ever reduced or stopped your use of a drug manufacturer's products because of what you believe to be misleading or objectionable
advertising in any form (i.e. include impressions made by drug detailman)?
In their answers to this question there was a marked divergence between
specialists and general practitioners, but the reasons for this are not known
(rable VIII). In any case, it is significant that almost one-half of all doctors
replying stated that they had reacted in this way to misleading or objectionable
advertising.
TABLE VIII.--INFLUENCE ON PRESCRIBING PRACTICES OF
OBJECTIONABLE ADVERTISING
Choice of answers

Yes
(percent)

No
(percent)

Total
answers

39
59
49

61
41
51

263
248
518

Specialists ...............................
General practitioners ....................
All doctors ..............................
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tion on new drugs. The question inevitably arises: Is he qualified to
assume that responsibility? The lay press has answered "no" with
generalized accusations portraying detailmen as "unethical," misleading, and dangerous 29 "drug peddlers" 80 who in their relations
with the medical profession follow the maxim: "if you can't convince them, confuse them.""' Academic investigators have reached
contrary conclusions, stating that "85% of general practitioners
[give the detailman] a strong vote of confidence because his new drug
information is valuable to them. 38 2 These researchers show that the
detailman is second in importance only to experience with products
38
in affecting the physician's opinion of a specific drug company.
Other investigators have found that except for the opinions of physician's colleagues, the most preferred source of information relating
84
to drugs is the detailman.
Whereas the lay press has exposed the vices of the detailman and
academic researchers have applauded his virtues, the law has been
derelict in recognizing his existence. Courts have focused precious
little attention on him. More disturbing, the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 5 its comprehensive 1962 Drug Amendments, 0 and
the rules of the Food and Drug Administration 7 are not applicable
to the detailman's activities.
II.
A.

TmomEs OF LIABILITY

Common Law and State Imposed Standards

1. Negligence and Strict Liability
The common law imposes upon the manufacturer the duty to
warn s of dangers involved in the use of his product of which he
29. See speech by Senator McIntyre, 114

CONo. REc.

30987 (1968).

30. Sanford, The Drug Peddlers, Naw R.zumrna Sept. 21, 1968, excerpt reprinted
in 114 CoNG. REc. 30987 (1968).
31. A. Console's statement made before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee of the Judiciary (Kefauver Subcommittee) during the Administered Price Hearings, 86th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. (1961-62), reprintedin 114 CoNG.
REc. 21988 (July 18, 1968). See also R. HAums, Tim REAL VoICE at 91 (1964).
32. Hagood and Owen supra note 24, at 111.
33. Id. at 113. But cf. Burkholder, in B. KELLER AND M. SMrrH, supra note 5, at 291.

34. Physicians' Reactions, supra note 24, Table II. Compare "Manufacturer's
spoken advertisement" with "Colleagues or consultant recommendations."
35. 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-392 (1961).
36. 76 Stat. 780.
37. Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. (1972).
38. See generally, 1 L. FRuman & M. FvuMmAnN, PRoDucrs LsABILrrY § 8 (1971) [hereinafter FRUMm & FREmAN]; W. PROSSER, LAW or ToRrs 644. 648-9 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter PROSSER, 4Tn]. An excellent and often cited article on this subject which

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol1/iss1/14

10

et al.: Ubiquitous Detailman: An Inquiry Into His Functions and Activitie

Comments
knows, should know, or has reason to know.39 If he does not, the
manufacturer is negligent. 40 This duty extends beyond the time of
sale and attaches as soon as the manufacturer discovers that his product is dangerous or defective.41 The manufacturer, however, is not
obliged to warn of dangers which are known or obvious to the user
or are so generally well known that one can reasonably assume that
the user is aware of them.42 It is doubtful, however that this excepanalyzes the major court decisions in the area is Dillard & Hart, Products Liability:
Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955). See also Noel,
Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J.
816 (1962).
39. To be sure these terms have been diversely construed by various courts. See
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, Ill N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) ("There
must be knowledge of danger, not merely possible, but probable") (emphasis added).
But see O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286, 291 (8th Cir. 1967):
The (drug] manufacturer's duty to warn users of potential dangers inherent in
its product is commensurate with its actual knowledge of risk involved to those
users or knowledge constructively imparted to it by available scientific or other
medical data (emphasis added).
Sterling Drug Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1966) (knew or should have
known). Braun v. Roux Dist. Co., Inc., 312 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Mo. 1958) (Manufacturer
must keep abreast of scientific advances concerning his products and is held to an
expert's standard of care in his field) (emphasis added). Farley v. Edward E. Tower &
Co., 271 Mass. 230, 237, 171 N.E. 639, 642 (1980) (Manufacturer is presumed to have
knowledge of the nature and quality of his product) (emphasis added).
l~srATEAmTr (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 12 seeks to clarify the distinction between these
terms:
§ 12. Reason to Know; Should Know
(1) The words "reason to know" are used throughout the Restatement...
to denote the fact that the actor has information from which a person of
reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such person would govern his
conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists.
(2) The words "should know" are used throughout the Restatement ... to
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence or of
the superior intelligence of the actor would ascertain the fact in question in
the performance of his duty to another, or would govern his conduct upon
the assumption that such fact exists.
The manufacturer's liability for allergic reactions to his products is a well explored
field, but beyond the scope of this Comment. See Noel, The Duty to Warn Allergic
Users of Products, 12 VAND. L. REv. 331 (1959); Whitmore, Allergies and Other Reactions Due to Drugs and Cosmetics, 19 Sw. L.J. 76 (1965); Wright v. Carter Products,
Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2nd Cir. 1957); Braun v. Roux Dist. Co., supra. See also Keeton,
Some Observations About Strict Liability of the Maker of Prescription Drugs: The
Aftermath of MER/29, 56 CAL. L. Rav. 149, 154 (1968).
40. See, e.g., DeVito v. United Airlines, 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). But see

Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 79, 92 Cal. Rptr.
825, 827 (1st D. Ct. App. 1971) (Drug manufacturer not strictly liable for adverse reactions of which he had no knowledge).
41. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir. 1969);
Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 177-8, 99 N.W.2d 627, 634 (1959).
See also 1 FRUMER . FRMDMAN § 8.02 Continuing Duty to Warn; PRossER 4rn at 647.
42. See, e.g., 1 FRUmsR & FRMDMsAN §§ 7.02, 8.04; PROssER 4TH at 649; Singleton v.
Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corp. 131 So. 2d 329, 334 (3d Cir. Ct. App. La. 1961) ("Where
consequences of improper usage are such that they will be readily cognizable there is

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1973

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 14

Hofstra Law Review
tion applies to the pharmaceutical manufacturer since dangers are
involved in the use of his products which are not open and obvious. 48 Indeed, adverse effects often accompany the therapeutic benefit to be derived. 44
A pharmaceutical manufacturer can be negligent in manufacturing a drug or in marketing it.4r Unless the product is contaminated,
impure, defective, or adulterated at the time of manufacture, negligence in manufacturing is virtually impossible to show. 46 Although
pure drugs, by their very nature, are dangerous, such dangers are
both reasonable and permissable in light of society's health needs.
Indeed, standards for acceptable hazards are set by the FDA 47 thus
48
limiting the grounds for recovery.
Negligence in marketing can attach when the manufacturer begins to promote the sale or use of his product49 and often provides
an easier way for an aggrieved plaintiff to recover. When the pharno duty to warn of the particular consequences that flow therefrom."); Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 472, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804, 95 N.Y.S.2d 610, 612 (1950).
43. See Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 607 (Fla. 1958); Bean v. Ross
Manufacturing Co., 344 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1961) RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 397

Comment b (1965).
44. For a discussion of the hazards accompanying the use of ethical pharmaceuticaIs see E. MARTIN, HAZARDS OF MEDICATION: A MANUAL ON DRUG INTERACTIONS, INCOMPATABILrnS, CONTRAINDICATIONS, AND ADvERS E Emars (1971). See also PHYSICIAN'S
DESK REFERENCE [hereinafter PDR]. PDR is a voluminous listing of the most commonly prescribed ethical drugs. A verbatim copy of each drug's direction circular,
giving all the known features of each product is printed therein and is readily available for the doctor's reference. It is published by Medical Economics, Inc., a subsidiary

of Litton Publications, division of Litton Industries, Inc. and is supplemented and revised whenever necessary. The volume, supplements, and revisions are sent to each
physician gratis; the costs entailed are covered by the drug manufacturers who publish their products' direction circulars in the PDR.
45. See Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also
1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 8.01. For the purposes of this study, negligence in marketing
is synonymous with the manufacturer's failure to convey adequate warning as to dan.
gers attendant to the use of his products.
more often than
46. See 1 FRUMER 8, FRIEDMAN § 8.01 at 145 where it is stated: ...
not, proof of negligence as to [defect] ... presents more difficulties than proof of negligence in failing to warn." See also id. §§ 11.01, 12.02; Freedman, Defect in the Product: The Necessary Basis for ProductsLiability in Tort and in Warranty, in S. SCuEiBER AND P. RHEINGOLD, PRODUCTS LIABILrTY: LAw, PRACTICE, SCIENCE at 11:5 (1967);
Connolly, Evidentiary Problems in Product Cases, id. at 11:41.
47. Reasonable and permissible dangers are those warnings, precautions, adverse
reactions and contraindications which appear in the manufacturer's direction circular,
and which, in the judgment of FDA, do not outweigh the beneficial aspects to be
derived from the drug's use. See generally Simmons, FDA Looks at the Package Insert,
27 FooD DRUG Cosr. LJ. 117 (1972); Putnam, The Package Insert, id. at 109; Package
Inserts as Legal Documents, in E. MARTIN supra note 44, at 98; An Exchange of Views
on the Package Insert in W. CURRAN AND E. Stmmr'o, LAw, MEDICINE, AND FORENSIC
SCIENCE 728-38 (2d ed. 1970).
48. This is also true in strict liability. See RESTATEM NT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
Comment k.
49. See generally, PROSSER 4TH at 646-7; Comment, 52 IoWA L. REv. 1213 (1967).
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maceutical manufacturer markets his products, he must exercise his
duty to warn of the dangerous propensities of his drugs. The purpose

of such warning is to reduce the likelihood that a patient will be injured by those unavoidable product risks which are created during

the manufacturing process. The detailman is the most significant
means of conveying these warnings to the prescribing physician.50
It is now generally accepted that a manufacturer must warn the
ultimate consumer of product dangers. Where the product is a pre-

scription drug however, the rule is not so dear. It has been argued51
that the aggrieved patient has no cause of action against a drug house
for negligence in marketing because the duty to warn runs to the
physician, not to the patient. The argument continues that an ethical drug is not intended for sale to or use by consumers without a
doctor's prescription. Therefore the patient-consumer is disqualified
from using the manufacturer's failure to warn the physician as the
basis of a negligence action. There is precedent for this argument. 2
In 1964 this absolute bar was modified by Love v. Wolf 3 in which
a California appellate court held that:
...[I]f

adequate warning of the potential dangers of a drug
has been given to doctors, there is no duty by the drug manufacturer to insure that the warning reaches the doctor's patient
for whom the drug is prescribed. 4
[B]ut if the [detailman's] over-promotion can reasonably
be said to have induced the doctor to disregard the warnings
previously given, the warning given is thereby withdrawn or
cancelled and if ...[a] jury could [find] that [a] doctor...

actually prescribed the drug to cure an infection for which the
company's advertising or its detailmen actually recommended
its use, then the pharmaceutical company's negligence remains as an inducing cause coinciding with the negligence of
the doctor to produce the results. 55
Since it is the patient who will make the actual purchase of the
drug, he is the ultimate target of the detailman's promotional ac50. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969) discussed infra.
51. Freedman, Prescriptionor Ethical Drugs: Fallaciesas to Warranties, Failure to
Warn, and Strict Liability in Tort, 21 FOOD DRuG Cosa. LJ.599 (1966).
52. Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897, 899 (D.D.C. 1963); Parker v. State, 201
Misc. 416, 422, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735, 741 (Ct. Cl. 1951); Marcus v. Specific Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 191 Misc. 285, 77 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. 1948). See also Freedman, supra note 51,
at 605. But see Gielski v. State, 3 Misc. 2d 578, 583, 155 N.Y.S.2d 863, 868 (Ct. Cl. 1956).

53. 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (3d D. Ct. App. 1964).
54. Id. at 395, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
55. Id. at 400, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
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tivities. Therefore, the detailman's failure to discharge his employer's duty to warn the physician is negligence in marketing upon
which a plaintiff's cause of action can be sustained. This is so because the warning is given to prevent harm to a foreseeable plaintiff
8
-the patient.5
In 1968, the question of to whom the pharmaceutical manufacturer owes the duty to warn was considered by the Ninth Circuit.
In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories,Inc., 57 the court reasoned that it is
the manner in which a drug is distributed that determines to whom
the manufacturer must state his warnings. The drug accused of causing irreparable injury to the plaintiff was the Sabin Type III polio
vaccine. The court stated that:58
Ordinarily in the case of prescription drugs warning to the
prescribing physician is sufficient. In such cases the choice involved is essentially a medical one involving an assessment of
medical risks in the light of the physician's knowledge of his
patient's needs and susceptibilities. Further, it is difficult under such circumstances for the manufacturer, by label
or direct communication, to reach the consumer with a warning. A warning to the medical profession is, in such cases, the
only effective means by which a warning could help the patient.
Here, however, although the drug was denominated a prescription drug, it was not dispensed as such. It was dispensed
to all comers at mass clinics without an individualized balancing by a physician of the risks involved. In such cases (as in
the case of over-the-counter sales of non-prescription drugs)
warning by the manufacturer to its immediate purchaser will
not suffice. The decision (that on balance and in the public
interest the personal risks to the individual was worth taking)
may well have been that of the medical society and not that of
[the manufacturer]. But just as the responsibility for choice is
not one that the manufacturer can assume for all comers,
neither is it one that he can allow his immediate purchaser to
assume. In such cases then, it is the responsibility of the manu56. See generally PROSSER 4TH at 642: "It is now generally recognized that a manufacturer or even a dealer has a responsibility to the ultimate consumer, based upon
nothing more than the sufficient fact that... [their products] are likely to come into
the hands of another, and to do harm if they are defective." But see Freedman, supra
note 51, at 604, who maintains that a patient does not purchase a prescription drug
since the filling of a physician's prescription is a service.
57. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
58. Id. at ISO.
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facturer to see that warning reach the consumer either by giving warning itself or by obligating the purchaser to give
warning.
The Davis ruling was revolutionary. This was the first time that
a prescription drug, statutorily defined in 21 U.S.C. § 353, was, by
operation of law, equated with a non-prescription drug where the
warning is stated directly to the consumer. The implication of such
reasoning is astounding. Although it is the responsibility of the physician to choose whether or not to prescribe a drug, under certain
circumstances the patient must be included in this decision making
process. It is the duty of the drug company to provide the patient
with sufficient information so that he can be an informed and intelligent participant in whatever choice is made."
Although the court did not address itself to negligence in marketing, but rather to strict liability,60 the resulting liability is indistinguishable from liability for negligence.' This is so because failure
to warn constitutes negligence in marketing. In terms of strict liability, a manufacturer is liable for injury resulting from a defective or
unreasonably dangerous product. Thus the negligence of the drug
manufacturer in not warning the proper party of dangers attendant
to the use of its product ipso facto renders that product defective or
unreasonably dangerous, at which point strict liability attaches. To
quote the Davis court:
[W]e reject [the manufacturer's] contention that the rule [of
strict liability] applies only where unreasonable danger results
because of an ascertained "defect" or "impurity" in the product, and since this ... [polio vaccine] was precisely what it was
59. To be sure Davis, id., has opened a Pandora's Box. For a similar example, see
21 CF.R. § 180.45 (1972) wherein the FDA requires that manufacturers of oral contraceptives give consumers a diluted warning of side effects and dangers. Although
fascinating, examination of the Box and its contents is beyond the scope of this Comment.
60. 399 F.2d 121 at 125: "Appellant stated claims found on (1) negligent manufacture, (2) failure to warn of known dangers, (3) strict liability in tort and (4) breach of
implied warranty of fitness." The court relied on RE SrATEmENT (SEcoND) or ToRTS

§ 402A Comments j and k as the basis of imposing liability on the manufacturer, id.
at 127, n.10.
61. W. PRossER & J. WADE, ToRTs: CAsES & MATERIAS, 727 n.2 (5th ed., 1971): "In
occasional cases, such as [Davis], the liability has been put on the basis of implied
warranty, or strict liability in tort, on the ground that a product sold without adequate
warning is unsafe or 'defective.' But since the question is one of reasonable warning,
the liability is not distinguishable from negligence." But see Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TExAs L. REv. 598 (1969).
Although distinctions between various theories of liability may at times be obscured, the affirmative defenses appropriate to each serve to remind us of the important differences between the theories.
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intended to be, there was no such defect. The true test in a
case of this kind is whether the product was unreasonably
62
dangerous.
We conclude that the facts of this case imposed on the
manufacturer a duty to warn the consumer (or make adequate provision for his being warned) as to risks involved, and
that failure to meet this duty rendered the drug unfit in the
sense that it was thereby rendered unreasonably dangerous.
Strict liability, then, attached to its sale in the absence of
warning.63
While in 1968 the Davis court addressed itself to the question of
to whom the manufacturer must direct its warning, in 1969 the
Eighth Circuit, in Sterling Drug,Inc., v. Yarrow, 4 directed its attention to the problem of how this warning must be conveyed. The
court held that the manufacturer must deliver the warning to the
proper party in the "most effective" method.0 5 The trial court had
found that the "most significant and efficient means" 60 of conveying
this warning is neither through revisions of advertising material, nor
through PDR supplementation, nor via a first class letter personally
addressed to the physician on which is boldly printed: IMPORTANT DRUG PRECAUTION, but instead, through the detailman. The trial court declared that since 7
... the

doctor is inundated with the literature and product
cards of various manufacturers... a change in the literature
or an additional letter intended to present new information
on drugs to the doctor is insufficient [although this is all the
FDA requires]. The most effective method employed by the
drug company in the promotion of new drugs is... [the] detail man; thus, ... this would also present the most effective
method of warning the doctor about recent developments in
drugs already employed by the doctor, at no great additional
expense. The detail men visit the doctors at frequent intervals
62. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir. 1968).
63. Id. at 130.
64. 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
65. Id. at 993. Accord, Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 289, 282 A.2d 206, 220
(1971).
66. Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163 (S.D.S.D. 1967), ard 408
F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969). But cf. Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 523, 276 A.2d 36, 40
(1971) (duty of drug manufacturer is to give reasonable warning, not the best one).
67. 263 F. Supp. 159 at 163. See also the appellate court's response to appellant's
argument that this finding is erroneous, 408 F.2d 978 at 993.
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and could make an effective oral warning,... that would affirmatively notify the doctor of side effects ....
On appeal, the force of this finding was somewhat attenuated in
that the court only held that:68

[W]here a drug is manufactured without negligence, but is
unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable warning of a side effect is not given, the manufacturer may be held liable for the
injury resulting from the failure to give a warning reasonable
under the circumstances.
The appellate court was not as emphatic as the trial court that the
detailman is the "most effective method" of conveying the warning
to the physician. In an effort that appears to skirt this question the
higher court adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 295A.6 9
Applying the custom of the industry standard to drug manufacturers, this custom must be considered as a factor in whether or not the
defendant manufacturer acted reasonably in not using its detailing
force. Since the custom was to warn through the detailman 7° and because Sterling did not even inform its detailmen about the newly
discovered side effect, it had acted unreasonably. It was therefore
both strictly liable in tort and negligent in marketing as well.
The negligence and strict liability actions have been the most
widely exploited causes of action against the drug manufacturer who
fails to warn of dangers attendant to the use of his products. Questions as to whom the warning must go and how it should be conveyed have been progressively given answers which signal a departure
from older more settled precedent.
2. Deceit
The conflict between the duty to sell and the duty to warn is
clearly visible in the detailman's statements to physicians. Where
the detailman de-emphasizes or omits product risks in his discussions
with the doctor in order to induce him to prescribe, the drug manu68. 408 F.2d 978 at 993. See also Comment 55 MNN. L. REv. 148 (1970).
69. § 295A Custom:
In determining whether conduct is negligent, the customs of the community,
or others under like circumstances, are factors to be taken into" account, but
are not controlling where a reasonable man would not follow them.
70. Compare with Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 289, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (1971)

in which the court states that whether the detailman is an effective means of selling
a product and explaining its nature is a determination for the jury. If so, whether he
is also an effective medium of conveying warning is a question for the jury too.
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facturer may be held liable for deceit.7 1 While this ancient intentional tort action 72 has not been used as frequently"8 against the
drug manufacturer as negligence and strict liability have been, several holdings indicate that the plaintiff's major obstacles to recovery
for deceit have been largely removed.
To recover damages for deceit the patient who is injured by the
detailman's failure to warn the physician must establish the follow74
ing elements to sustain his cause of action:
a. that the detailman made a material representation of fact;
b. that this representation was false;
c. that the detailman "knew" of the falsity of the representation;
d. that the detailman intended the plaintiff to rely upon the
representation and that the plaintiff justifiably relied on this statement; and
e. that the misrepresentation was the proximate cause7 5 of the
plaintiff's injury.
a. Materiality of the factual representation: While it is unlikely
today that the detailman would promote a drug for a disease entity
for which it is not indicated 76 he need not go that far in order to
make a material misrepresentation of fact. Where a detailman intentionally fails to disclose dangerous or fatal propensities of his
product he has thereby made the requisite material misrepresenta7 It is now generally accepted that where one begins to speak
tionY
"he must disclose enough to prevent his words from being misleading."7 8 Although the extent of the detailman's non-disclosure may
help to define whether or not his statement is "material" such a determination can only be made by looking also at the experience and
knowledge of the prescribing physician to whom the detailman
71. See e.g. F. MACHEl, ON

FREDmAN § 17.
72. PROSSER 4th

AGENCY

§ 1995 et seq. (2d ed. 1914); 2

FRUMMER &

at 685.
73. See an excellent and frequently cited article by Rheingold, Products LiabilityThe Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RtrrEaRs L. Rxv. 947, 980 (1964). See
also Comment, Products Liability--The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and Strict
Liability in Tort, 64 MCH. L. Rnv. 1350, 1351 (1966).
74. These, of course, are the elements of a misrepresentation action. See generally
2 FRumER & FIEDMAN § 17. See also 3 FRubmR & FRIEDMAN § 33.03 discussing and citing several deceit cases against drug manufacturers.
75. The issue of causation has long been a source of debate. Space limitations would
render a distinct injustice to this lively topic if it were treated herein. It has therefore
been omitted.
76. This is a conclusion drawn from personal experience.
77. Wechsler v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 198 Misc. 540, 99 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
78. PROSSER 4th at 696.
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spoke. Non-disclosure is probably more "material" when the detailman addresses a physician who has had little experience prescribing
the drug being promoted than when an experienced prescriber of
that product is involved.
A more reliable barometer of materiality of representations is
found in the physician-detailman relationship. 7 This relationship
may be characterized as fiduciary in nature. Because of this special
relationship of trust and reliance a high degree of disclosure is necessary. 80
The classic problem of whether a salesman's statements are his
own opinion or a form of "puffing" 81 or whether they are factual is
of little importance to the detailman. The detailman is, of course, the
representative of the drug company to the physician. Since a phar82
maceutical manufacturer is held to an expert's standard of care,
the detailman's statements are by implication based on superior
knowledge. Thus the court in Toole v. Richardson-Merrell8 stated:8 4
Where the party making the representations has superior
knowledge regarding the subject matter of his representations
and the other party is so situated that he may reasonably rely
on such supposed superior knowledge or special information
the representations may be construed as fact and not opinion.
b. The "falsity" of the representation: There are three types of
statements which may render the detailman's representation false.
First, there is blatant misrepresentation, the falsity of which can
be easily ascertained by an inspection of a product's direction circular. Thus a detailman seeking to persuade a physician that his company's brand of chloramphenicol may be used to treat minor sore
throats and colds has blatantly misrepresented the true purpose for
which this drug should be used.8 5
Second, the extent of the detailman's non-disclosure may determine whether or not his statement is false. Thus, for example, if a
79. See Section I B of text supra.
80. See 14 Am. & ENG. ENCY. or LAw 123, as cited in Edward Barron Estate Co. v.
Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 576, 126 P. 551, 357 (1912) ("When one of the parties ...
places a known trust and confidence in the other, any misrepresentation by the party
confided in with respect to a material fact and constituting an inducement to the
other party ... is regarded as a fraud. The same is true where the circumstances are
such that one of the parties must necessarily trust in the representations of the other.")
81. PROSSER 4th at 653, 721. See also 46 A.m. JuR., Sales § 326.
82. See, e.g., Braun v. Roux Dist. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Mo., 1958).
83. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1st D. Ct. App. 1967).
84. Id. at 706, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
85. PDR, 1971 at 996 (Parke Davis' CHmoaomycamN); 882 (McKesson's AapmcoL);
1066 (Rachelle's MAcYL).
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detailman honestly informs a physician that his brand of indomethacin is effective in reducing fever,"' but omits that it is indicated
only in certain types of arthritic conditions, then that physician may
conceivably prescribe this drug for an infant running a high fever,
a condition for which it is specifically contraindicated. The sensitive
question which a jury must answer in such cases is: At what point
does a detailman's non-disclosure of dangers attendant to the use of
a drug necessarily render his statement false? For the drug manufacturer to raise his product's direction circular as a defense to intentional non-disclosure begs the question. Most physicians do not
have time to read numerous and complicated direction circulars
prior to deciding which drug is appropriate for each patient.8 7 For
this reason he must rely on the detailman's encapsulated statement
of warnings and proper usage. Furthermore, even if proper warning
is given in the direction circular the detailman's over-promotion may
nullify the printed warning.88
Third, ambiguities in the detailman's statements may render
them false. Thus a detailman may tell a physician that his brand of
phenylbutazone 9 is indicated for patients with gout. The physician
may reasonably understand this statement, albeit true, to mean that
this product is effective in alleviating the etiology of gout, i.e. increased uric acid levels. This impression is substantially false: phenylbutazone has only a mild effect on the etiology of gout; in fact,
when used to treat this chronic disease, its toxicity precludes its use
in long term therapy. The late Dean Prosser is instructive on this
point: 90
Ambiguous statements which are reasonably capable of both
a true and a false meaning will amount to misrepresentation
if the false meaning is accepted. Likewise, misrepresentation
may be found in statements which are literally true, but which
create a false impression in the mind of the hearer.
c. "Knowledge" of the falsity of the representation: The requirement that the detailman "know" that his statement is false does not
86. PDR, 1971 at 947 (MSD's IND oiN).

87. See the Yarrow court's reasoning on this point supra note 67 and accompanying text.
88. Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 400, 38 Cal. Rptr. 188, 196 (3d D. Ct. App.
1964).
89. PDR, 1971 at 722 (Geigy's BrTAZoLmiN).
90. PRossER 4th at 695. See also Keeton, Fraud: Concealment and Non-Disclosure,
15 TExAs L. REv. 1 (1986); Intl Products Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 244 N.Y. 831, 338, 155
NYE. 662, 664 (1927).
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place a serious burden on a plaintiff since courts have interpreted
"knowledge" liberally.9 ' Difficulty may arise however in imputing
this knowledge to the defendant drug manufacturer in a deceit action. The thrust of authority recognizes that in view of the doctrine
of respondeat superior92 and general principles of agency law93 this
problem is academic.
d. Intent and reliance: The intent of the defendant manufacturer
that the physician rely on the detailman's statements presents no obstacle to recovery since this is the very purpose for which detailmen
are employed. 94 The detailman however does not make any representations to the patient who has sustained a drug-induced injury.
The detailman does not intend that the patient rely on any statement nor can the patient justifiably rely on any representation not
made to him. How then can the injured plaintiff sustain this burden?
The court in Wechsler v. Hoffman-La Roche95 stated that:9 6
Reliance upon fraudulent representations by persons who are
not the direct addressees thereof but who may be intended or
expected to learn of and act upon such representations will
found an action in fraud and deceit. Defendant here claims,
however, that its representations were made to physicians and
not to the intestate.., and would thus avoid liability in fraud
even if the allegations in the complaint are true. But in my
view one who misrepresents for his gain and benefit, at the
expense of human life, should be answerable in fraud for all
reasonable and foreseeable consequences of his deception. If
a more direct nexus between the fraudulent misrepresentation and the intestate is essential, it may be supplied by the
circumstance that the physician who prescribed the drug was
acting on behalf of the intestate and the fraud committed on
the doctor was, therefore, a fraud upon the intestate.
91. Even where one makes a statement without knowledge of its truth or falsity,
and this statement is in fact false, the lack of such knowledge is sufficient to supply
the intent required in a deceit action. See, e.g., Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp. v.
Hyman Michaels Co., 133 S.W.2d 426, 428 (St. Louis Ct. App. Mo., 1939); PROSSER 4th

at 701. See also Comment, 64 MIcH. L. R.v. supra note 76, at 1352.
92. See, e.g., F. M csmi, ON AGENCY §§ 1855-1859 (2d ed. 1914).
93. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) AGENCY, §§ 251, 257, 261, 265-7. See also Ira S.
Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968) (If the servant's intentional torts were committed within the "activities of the enterprise" the master
will be charged with liability as a cost of the enterprise).
94. See Section I B of text supra.
95. 198 Misc. 540, 99 N.YS.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
96. Id. at 541-542, 99 N.Y.S2d at 590.
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In Marcus v. Specific Pharmaceuticals," the court found that the
defendant was not negligent for failure to give adequate information regarding its prescription product, but had the plaintiff brought
an action for misrepresentation, recovery might have been granted.
In dicta the court stated: 98
... it

is difficult to see on what basis this defendant can be
liable to plaintiff. It made no representation to plaintiff....
To physicians it did make representations. And should any of
these be false it might be claimed with propriety that they
were made for the benefit of the ultimate consumer. But there
is no such claim. The sole claim is not misrepresentation or
even concealment, but a negligent failure to give adequate
warning...
In Toole v. Richardson-Merrell,99 where the manufacturer withheld clinical investigation reports on its product, MER/29, in order
to secure FDA approval for marketing, the court characterized the
physician who received the fraudulent statements as the agent of
the injured patient: 100
Appellant . . . says there is no evidence to show that respondent relied upon any of its representations. But there
was evidence from which the jury could readily infer reliance
on the representations. Respondent's doctor, his agent, relied
upon them. The doctor ... relied upon the literature supplied by appellant and ... he talked to appellant's [detailman] on many occasions about the drug. The [fraudulent]
statements concerning safety of the drug and its lack of side
effects were included in the literature, and the salesman had
been instructed to stress such factors when talking to doctors.
The jury could infer that appellant's representations were
read and heard by respondent's doctor and that he relied
upon them in prescribing the drug for respondent's use.
Whether we call the physician who receives the detailman's statements the agent of the patient, or the "learned intermediary" 101 between the drug manufacturer and the patient is not important.
Deceit may be as appropriate a remedy for the injured plaintiff as
negligence and strict liability, but this too does not address itself to
97. 191 Misc. 285, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 508, (Sup. Ct., 1948).
98. Id. at 287, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 509.

99. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Ist D. Ct. App. 1967).
100. Id. at 707, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
101. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 870 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir., 1966).
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our main concern. The threat of tort liability hangs over the drug
company, but the detailman usually does not appreciate it. Tort
liability provides only remedial action against a master whose servant
has erred; it does not offer solutions that would force a detailman to
consider warning more important than selling.
3. Breach of Warranty
Unlike the negligence, strict liability, and deceit actions, a
breach of warranty0 2 action is contractual in nature, 10 3 hence governed by Article 2 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. While roadblocks to recovery such as privity,104 necessity for a sale,10 5 and notification of breach 0 6 have largely been removed by the courts in drug
102. This action is rooted in tort law and has developed along these lines. In view

of the fact that a warranty also has commercial or contractual qualities, this section
will analyze how the injured patient can use the warranties provided for in the UmFomi COotERCLAL. CODE as his basis of legal recourse. See generally, Spangenberg,
Aspects of Warranties Relating to Defective Prescription Drugs, 37 U. OF COLO. L.
REV. 194 (1965); Comment, The Contractual Aspects of Consumer Protection: Recent
Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64 MxcH. L. R.v. 1430 (1966); Comment,
Commercial Transactions:Defenses in Drug Product Liability Cases, 17 OELA. L REv.
318 (1964).
103. See Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrast Between
the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692
(1965). But ef. Stromsodt v. Parke Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D. 1966), in
which the court compares and contrasts the strict liability and warranty actions: "As
4
pointed out in 2 FRU MR & FREDMAN, Chapter 3, Sec. 16A E]: ... If a court imposes

strict warranty liability irrespective of contract and sales rules, then strict liability in
warranty and tort are synonymous." Id. at 997.
104. UNiFoRM CommEciAL CODE § 2-318 minimally extends privity beyond the immediate purchaser. Courts have ameliorated the harshness of this rule. See, e.g., Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1st D. Ct. App.
1960); Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322
(2nd D. Ct. App. 1963).
For a state by state analysis of the status of the privity requirement see 2 FRUmER
& FREmAN § 16.04[12. See also, Note, The Uniform Commercial Code and Greater
Consumer Protection Under Warranty Law, 49 Ky. L.J. 240 (1966).
For a discussion of "vertical privity" see UNom CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 3.
105. See, e.g., Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 442 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). A problem may still exist as to whether the administration of a drug in a hospital is a sale or a service. See Perimutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123
N.E.2d 792 (1954); Cheshire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d
531 (Sup. Ct. 1967). But see Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eustler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir.
1960); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Law Div. 1967);
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1st
D. App. Ct. 1969); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp. of Phil., 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867
(1970).
106. See, e.g., Bennett v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150, 153 (E.D. Ill.
1964). See also PROSSER 4r at 655 where he states: "In order to circumvent the statute,
the courts were forced to resort to rather transparent devices, holding that a long

delay is 'reasonable' or that the provision was not intended to apply to personal injuries." (footnotes omitted); UNioRM COmMERCiAL CODE § 2-607 Comment 4 regarding notification of breach in consumer and commercial cases; Phillips, Notice of Breach
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liability cases, the central issue as to whether the detailman's oral
promotional statements create warranties has received little attention. In regard to these statements, we are concerned only with those
warranties created in the marketing of the drug, that is, express
warranty and implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
One recent case has alluded to the creation of express warranties
as a result of the detailman's promotional statements. In Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell07 the court found that an express warranty exists
when factual statements regarding a drug's effectiveness and safety
are "widely made to the medical profession generally, [are] orally
made by detailmen in soliciting use of the drug by the profession,
and [are] made by means of advertisement in medical journals and

periodicals."108
A detailman's oral promotional statements of fact or promise
can well create an express warranty under UCC § 2-313 provided
that-these affirmations are neither his opinion of the product nor a

common sales talk. 0 9 The plaintiff's major problem with the warranty action has been the requirement that he rely on the warranty
statement in order for him to sustain the cause of action.0 1 To
in Sales and Strict Liability in Tort: Should There Be a Difference?, 47 IND. L.J. 45
(1972).
107. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1st D. Ct. App. 1967).
108. Id. at 706, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 411. In Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F.
Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court thought it unnecessary to reach a decision as to
whether oral promotional statements "can be properly characterized as express warranties" because of its finding that the manufacturer had breached an implied warranty of merchantability in releasing onto the market what the court felt was a
"defective product." The court's reasoning as to the nature of the defect is at 486-440.
109. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313 provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of
the goods does not create a warranty.
Query as to whether product samples which the detailman gives the physician for
his patients' use, create an express warranty under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313
(1)(c).
110. See Rheingold, supra note 73, at 977; Bordicks, Unwanted Pregnancy and the
Pill-The Question of Liability of the Manufacturer, 41 U. OF CINN. L. REx. 335, 341
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require this is to perpetuate the antiquities of an old common law
tort action. Warranty in tort is a vestige which serves no useful function in a dynamic economic system."' In order to deal with the legal
complexities of our free enterprise system, the UCC was enacted into
law. To ignore its existence is to defeat the purpose for which
legislatures have enacted it.
UCC § 2-313 requires no reliance 2 in order to create or prove
the breach of an express warranty. The requirement which must be
satisfied, however, is that the promise or affirmation of fact be "part
of the basis of the bargain." The detailman's statement relating to
the product may come either before or after the actual purchase
of the drug by the patient. So long as the promise or affirmation of
fact is part of the basis of an extended transaction between the
manufacturer and the purchasing patient 1 3 the warranty is created.
While there is no case law which holds that a detailman's statements create an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose,
a reasonable interpretation of UCC § 2-315" 4 leads to this conclu(1972). The confusion as to whether or not a plaintiff must rely on an express warranty
in order to prove its breach is exemplified by two articles by the same author. Compare
Freedman, supra note 51, at 603 (reliance is required) with Freedman, Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 PRAC. LAw. 49, 51 (April, 1964) (no reliance is required).
111. Admittedly, vestiges of tort law have been incorporated into UNIFoR ComMERCIAL CODE § 2-715:
(2) Consequential damage resulting from the seller's breach include
(b) injury to person or property proximately caused from any breach of
warranty.
Regarding the proximate cause requirement see § 2-314 Comment 13; § 2-715 Comment 5.
112. See UNIFORM COMMERCUL CODE § 2-313, Comment 3: "... no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the
agreement." But see id. Comment 2: ". . . the warranty sections of this Article are
not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized
that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties
to such a contract."
113. R. NoRDsrom, SALEs, 1970, §§ 67, 68; U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 7:
The precise time when words of description or affirmation are made or samples
shown is not material. The sole question is whether the language or samples
or models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract. If language is used
after the closing of the deal ... the warranty becomes a modification, and need
not be supported by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order
(Section 2-209).
114. UNIFORM CortnxcIAL CODE § 2-315, Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular
PurposeWhere the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless
excluded or modified ... an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
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sion. Since the physician often relies" 5 on the detailman's skill or
judgment in selecting a suitable product for particular disease entities, knowledge on the part of the detailman that the doctor is so
relying may be sufficient to create the implied warranty under

§ 2-315.
Physicians do occasionally review a patient's medical chart with
a detailman and ask for specific suggestions as to what course of
therapy should be followed.1 16 Indeed, the detailman does not promote drugs in a vacuum. In his product discussions he often requests
the physician to try his product samples on particular patients. In
cases such as these a warranty action under UCC § 2-315 seems perfectly appropriate. Unlike other UCC warranties, this is the only
one that requires that the physician, who receives the warranty statement for the benefit of the patient,"17 actually rely on the detailman's
statements.
8
B. Federal Statutory and Regulatory Standards"1

Governmental control of the pharmaceutical industry today stems
from the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.110 An analysis of
the statute reveals that no provision therein relates to the detailman
nor to any oral statements that he makes in the promotion of drugs.
One commentator has argued that "the detailer's oral presentation
is subject to Section 502(f)(l) [of the Act] inasmuch as his mention
of uses not covered by the approved new drug application or estab20
lished as safe and effective for that drug would be actionable."'
There is no evidence to support this statement. Section 502(f)(l)
provides that "A drug ... shall be misbranded . . . (f) Unless its
labeling bears (1) adequate directions for use .... 121
"Labeling includes labels, and . . . other written, printed or
115. See Section I B of text supra.
116. This happened quite frequently to the author during his course of employment as a detailman.
117. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 609, 6 Cal. Rptr.
320, 324, (Ist D. Ct. App. 1960); Wechsler v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 198 Misc. 540, 99
N.Y.S.2d 588, 590 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
118. An excellent article which seems to have gone virtually unnoticed is Boland,
Federal Regulation of Prescription Drug Advertising and Labeling, 12 B.C. IND. &
CoM. L. REv. 203 (1970). See also Ferg and Morrow, The Crystallization of American
Drug Law, 14 ARiz. L. Rev. 380 (1972); Baumgartner and Morrell, PharmaceuticalIndustry Regulation By The Department of Justice, 23 SvRAcuss L. REV. 785 (1972). A
helpful book entitled FooD, DRUG, AND COSMEnO INDUS1'RY (1972) has been published
by the Practising Law Institute.
119. 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1961).

120. Willig, supra note 10, at 222.
121. Section 502(0(1), 52 Stat. 1050, 21 U.S.C. § 352(0(1).
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graphic matter upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers,
122
or accompanying such article.2
"Adequate directions for use" is partially defined in Title 21,
Section 1.106(a) of the Code of Federal Regulations in the following
1 23
way:
"Adequate directions for use" means directions under which
the layman can use a drug or device safely and for the purposes
for which it is intended. Directions for use may be inadequate
[thus rendering the drug misbranded] because (among other
reasons) of omissions, in whole or in part, or incorrect specification of:
(1) Statements of all conditions, purposes, or uses for
which such drug.., is intended, including conditions,
purposes, or uses for which it is prescribed, recommended or suggested in its oral, written, printed or
graphic advertising...
At first blush, it seems that this rule allows the FDA to examine
a detailman's oral statements in determining whether he has "misbranded" his company's product. This provision, however, applies
only to sales made directly to the consumer, where no physician's
prescription is required. Furthermore in U.S. v. Various Articles of
Device,1 24 Judge Gray of the Southern District of California stated: 2 5
It is ... my conclusion that the [oral] representations made
by the salesman . . . did not cause any of [the defendant's]
articles to be misbranded in violation of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.
In effect, the FDA has removed the detailman's oral statements from
its jurisdiction in a clause which follows that part of § 1.106(a)(1)
120
quoted above:
[E]xcept that such statements shall not refer to conditions,
uses or purposes for which the drug... can be safely used only
under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law and for
which it is advertised solely to such practitioner.
The same commentator argues that "any oral statements which
tend to show actual labeling as being incomplete, false, or misleading,
122. CCH F. D. Cosm. L. REP.

70, 151 (1972).

123. 21 CF.R. § 1.106(a)(1) (1972).
124. 256 F. Supp. 894 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
125. Id. at 897.

126. 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(a)(1) (1972).
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in the case of new drugs, is a potential basis for action under Section 505(e),"' 27 but this statement is likewise unsubstantiated. Section
505(e) also applies only to written statements. 12 Nor is Section 502(n)
pertinent in regard to the detailman's function, because this section
deals with written advertising statements. 29 This section requires,
in the words of William Goodrich, former Assistant General Counsel
of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, that "every
prescription drug advertisement and any other descriptive matter
issued to promote sales must contain a true statement of the formula,
the established name of the drug along with any trade name used,
and such other information in brief summary relating to side effects,
contraindications, and effectiveness as shall be required by [the] reg-

ulations.. ."130

Before the Drug Amendments of 1962131 were enacted into law,
the FDA had jurisdiction over drug labeling, not advertising. False
advertising was the province of the FTC. One of the evils which the
amendments sought to remedy was described by a distinguished
physician in 1964:182
Doctors are being systematically brainwashed by expensive
advertising in the paper of medical journals, by the daily influx of mountains of advertising mail, by free throwaway
71,059 (CCH
127. Willig, supra note 10, at 222. But see CCH F. D. CosAr. L. REP.
Explanation).
128. The 1962 Drug Amendments to the Act do not extend governmental control
to the detailman's oral representations. See Note, The Drug Amendments of 1962, 38
N.Y.U.L. REv., 1082, 1124, n.353 (1963), citing an interview with William Goodrich,
then Assistant General Counsel of H.E.W. It has been suggested, however, that Goodrich holds the opposite opinion. 114 CONG. REc. 30987 (Oct. 11, 1968).

129. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1972).
130. Goodrich, What FDA Expects in PrescriptionDrug Advertising, 22 FooD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 46, 47 (1967). See also 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(e) (1972).
131. The Drug Amendments of 1962 cover the broad topics of: 1) adequate controls in manufacture of drugs, 2) effectiveness and safety of new drugs, 3) records and
reports as to experience on new drugs, 4) new drug clearance procedure, 5) certification of antibiotics, 6) records and reports as to experience on antibiotics, 7) standardization of drug names, 8) drug labeling, 9) drug advertising, 10) information to
physicians, 11) drug factory inspection, 12) registration of drug manufacturers, 13)
drug patents. In regard to the legislative history of the amendments, Senator Kefauver's
comment is apropos: "Those in the future who attempt to study the legislative history
of this measure as it passed through its various stages may be forgiven if they become
somewhat confused." 108 CONG. RFEc. 20868 daily ed., Oct. 3, 1962, reprinted in an excellent article on the legislative history of the 1962 Drug Amendments, Note, The
New Drug Amendments of 1962: How Much Regulation?, 18 RUTGERS L. Rav. 101
(1963). For the text of the Drug Amendments of 1962 see 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.
News 909-929 (87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962). For the legislative history, see 2 U.S. Code
Cong. & Adm. News 2884-2936 (87th Cong. 2d Sess. 1962). See also Chadduck, 'In
Brief Summary': PrescriptionDrug Advertising 1962-71, FDA P"ERS, Feb., 1972, at 13.
132. See Ruge, Regulation of PrescriptionDrug Advertising: Medical Progress and
Free Enterprise,32 LAw & CoNrTmp. PRos. 650, 652 (1967).
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"educational" pamphlets published by commercial agencies
for the promotion of drug sales, by visiting detailmen, who
go from door-to-door of physicians' offices leaving elaborate
samples of new drugs and valueless combinations of old drugs,
together with reams of impressive but biased literature. It
is utterly impossible for most busy physicians to separate the
wheat from the chaff in this enormous volume of information
and misinformation.
The original version of the Drug Amendments sought to extend
FDA control over oral and written promotional statements, but as
133
enacted the amendments pertained solely to written material.
"Absent such a rule, promotional statements by detailers cannot
be easily categorized as either labeling or advertising."'134 Therefore,
FDA control does not cover exaggerated claims that might be made
by some drug salesmen who are more concerned with sales figures
than with their employer's duty to adequately wam physicians of
product dangers. Statutory and regulatory control does, however,
extend to the product literature that the detailman leaves with the
physician in addition to any promotional posters or cards used to
capture the physician's interest during the product presentation. This
literature must conform to regulatory provisions. 135 Violations of
these provisions may render a drug misbranded and may provide
grounds for the FDA to withdraw the manufacturer's new drug
application. 130
Nor can the courts adequately fill this void by construing oral
product presentations as either labeling or advertising. While it has
been suggested that the Yarrow case 13' has succeeded in doing so13s
this is not entirely accurate. A misbranded drug, within the meaning
of the statute and the Code of Federal Regulations gives the government, not the aggrieved plaintiff, a cause of action against the manufacturer. The only causes of action that are available to the injured
patient against the drug house are those discussed earlier-negligence, strict liability, deceit, and breach of warranty. While violations of statutory and regulatory standards may be negligence per
133. Id. at 653.
134. Id.

135. For extensive citations to and analysis of applicable regulatory provisions see
Boland, supra note 118.
136. For a review of the significance of the new drug application see Rheingold
supra note 73, at 959; Ferg and Morrow, supra note 121, at 386; Note, The Drug
Amendments of 1962, supra note 128, at 1086-96.
137. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
138. Ruge, supra note 132, at 653.
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se' 89 or at least evidence of negligence, 140 these will not furnish the
plaintiff with a cause of action because these violations are criminal
in nature. To state it differently, the FDA's right of action against
the manufacturer whose written advertising or labeling renders a
drug misbranded arises from statutory and regulatory transgressions
only. No such right of action is afforded the consumer by the statute.' 4 ' The rights of the injured plaintiff to pursue a civil remedy
where the detailman's oral statements do not adequately warn of
dangers attendant to the use of his drugs arise at common law. No
such rights of action are afforded the government.
In sum, statutory provisions and administrative regulations have
no application to the detailman's oral promotional claims. The statute speaks in terms of "true statements" in advertising, 42 the regulations in terms of "full disclosure"' 4 8 in labeling and "fair balance"' 4 4
in all of the manufacturer's written statements which relate to its
drug products. Only the common law actions discussed above, which
are reserved solely for the injured patient, speak in terms of the
"duty to warn"'145 orally or in writing. The government, therefore,
has no authority to prosecute a drug manufacturer for misbranding
its products where the detailman has exaggerated the advantages of
a drug or de-emphasized its risks, unless, of course, the manufacturer
14
has done the same in its labeling or advertising.
139. See generally Comment, Products Liability Based Upon Violation of Statutory
Standards, 64 Micas. L. REv. 1388 (1956); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eustler, 276 F.2d

455, 462 (4th Cir. 1960).

140. Compliance with the Act is at least some evidence of the exercise of due care;
therefore, non-compliance suggests the absence of due care. See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDAAN
§ 8.07[1] at 175; Phillips v. Roux Laboratories, 286 App. Div. 549, 145 N.Y.S.2d 449
(1st Dept. 1955). See also Stromsodt v. Parke Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D.
1966); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 281 A.2d 707 (1971)
(Compliance had no bearing on the exercise of due care). Contra, Lewis v. Baker, 243
Or. 817, 413 P.2d 400 (1966) (Compliance was synonymous with the exercise of due
care).
141. Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eustler, 276 F2d 455, 460 (4th Cir. 1960); 1 FRUMER
& FRmmEAN § 8.07[1] at 176.
142. Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 76 Stat. 791 § 131; 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1972).
143. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.105(e), 1.106 (1972). See TOuLMIN, THE LAw or FOOD, DRUGS,
AND Cosmarcs § 24.12a (1963).
144. 21 C.F.R. 1.105(e)(6) (1972).
145. See generally 1 FRumER & FPxMDaAN § 8.
146. In this regard, the following cases are noteworthy: United States v. Hohensee,
243 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957); V.E. Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34 (lst Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957); United States v. 3 Cartons, More or Less "No.
26 Formula GM" etc., 132 F. Supp. 569 (S.D. Cal. 1952); United States v. Articles of
Drug, etc., 362 F. Supp. 923 (3d Cir. 1966). These are all distinguishable in that oral
promotional statements were used in conjunction with written labeling and advertising as evidence of misbranding. Therefore, the detailman's oral promotional statements
alone do not constitute misbranding and are not actionable under applicable federal
statutes or regulations.
Furthermore, 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(e)(6) lists twenty violations which clearly render a
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III. CONCLUSION
The detailman is the victim of a dual allegiance. On one hand
he is interested in economic profits for his employer and himself. On
the other, he must convey vital drug information to physicians so
that patients may be treated safely and successfully. His position is
analogous to that of the lawyer who must serve the private interests
of his client on the one hand, and, uphold the law as an officer of the
court on the other. Unlike the detailman, lawyers have an institutionalized mechanism in bar association ethics committees which
compels them to balance what may often be conflicting allegiances.
Unlike the detailman, the lawyer is licensed to practice his profession. Indeed the detailman is perhaps the only member of the
health care team whose qualifications are not examined by a competent board or panel. While there are minimal training and licensing requirements for less vital health care workers, no such standards
have been formulated for detailmen. If the detailman were required
to be licensed, not only would the pharmaceutical industry be assured
of a stable, qualified pool of personnel to promote their products, but
physicians would be more apt to welcome these detailmen as reliable
and convenient sources of drug information. While the threat of
drug liability suits hangs over the pharmaceutical industry, this deterrent does not necessarily filter down to the detailman in the field.
The threat of being brought before the Ethics Committee directly
encourages the lawyer to balance his conflicting allegiances. A similar
institutionalized mechanism must therefore be created for the detailman.
Unlike the remedial actions which are available to the consumer,
licensure is preventive in nature. Its purpose is not to compensate
the injured patient but to protect him from becoming injured. The
Yarrow court's statement that the detailman is "the most significant
and efficient means" of conveying drug information is more a goal
to be achieved than a finding of ultimate fact. Only if the detailman
is highly trained and licensed can that goal be realized. Federal legislation along these lines is therefore imperative.
drug misbranded. 21 CY.F.R § 1.105(e)(7) adds thirteen violations which may render
a drug misbranded. These violations pertain solely to written advertising statements.
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